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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ANITA J. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15331

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant/Respondent.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The relief already sought on appeal, as requested
originally in Plaintiff's Brief, is reversal of Defendant's
decision denying Plaintiff Unemployment Compensation from
February 20, 1977, to April 2, 1977, and a declaration that
U.C.A. §35-4-5(a) is invalid insofar as it chills the exercise of religious and other freedoms guaranteed by the United
States and Utah constitutions.
Based upon the cases Plaintiff has examined in
replying to Defendant's Brief, Plaintiff now seeks, in the
alternative to Plaintiff's original request for relief, a
remand to the Industrial commission of Utah for a new hearing
so that the Industrial Commission may receive sufficient cornpetent evldLnce upon which to decide the entire case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are stated in Plaintiff's
Brief as originally filed with the Court.

For purposes of

this Reply Brief, Plaintiff will re-emphasize two sets of
facts.

First, Plaintiff was employed as Secretary/Stenogra-

pher by the University of Utah with the understanding that
she would not be required to work on Sundays.

Plaintiff made

this a requirement of accepting employment because her re1 igious belief is that Sundays are a day of rest to be employed

in worship of the Lord.

Notwithstanding this provision of

Plaintiff's contract, the employer made numerous requests
that Plaintiff work on Sundays, and Plaintiff was, in fact,
forced to work on three Sundays.

It was a demand by the

employer that Plaintiff work on Sunday, January 30, 1977,
which precipitated Plaintiff's decision not to report to
work and ultimately caused Plaintiff's termination of employmen1
Second, Plaintiff frequently was subjected, in the
presence of other employees, to false charges of improper
performance.

The employer wrote numerous memos charging

Plaintiff with faulty work and subjected Plaintiff to verbal
criticisms on numerous other occasions.

There was no factual

justification for these criticisms, Plaintiff's work being
competent and of good quality.

The only apparent reason

for the criticisms was the employer's dissatisfaction with
Plaintiff's refusals to work on Sundays and at other unreasonable hours.

When the employer realized that Plaintiff would

-2-
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not accede to such demands, the employer responded by criticizing Plaintiff's work.
These and other reasons made work intolerable for
Plaintiff and forced her to terminate her employment on
February 3, 1977.

She was informed she would be fired, in

any case, on February 4, 1977.
ARGUMENT
I

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION
OR TO A REMAND TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR REHEARING IF THE COMMISSION'S
FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.

As this Court stated in Martinez v. Board of Review,
25 U.2d 131, 477 P.2d 587, 588 (1970), the Court's review
in Unemployment Compensation cases is limited to deciding
whether there is "substantial competent evidence to sustain
the findings of the Appeals Referee and the Board of Review."
Where the decision of the Board of Review is supported by
substantial, competent evidence, the Court will affirm the
Industrial commission.

Martinez, supra.

However, the Court

has always recognized its duty to determine whether evidence
does support the Board of Review's decision.

As stated in

Roberts v. Industrial commission, 97 Utah 434, 93 P.2d 494,
495 (1939):
Each record of trial under this law should
be complete in and of itself. Each element
necessary to sustain an order by the tribunal or commission, under this law, should
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be supported by testimony, exhibits, or
stipulation, introduced at the hearing.
Where the record does not support the Industrial
Commission, this Court may elect either of two alternatives.
It may reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission.
See Roberts, supra; Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 Utah 2d 245, 420
P.2d 44 (1966).

Or it may remand the case to the Industrial

Commission to take additional evidence on issues about which
the record is unclear.

This latter course was elected in

Johnson v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 7
Utah 2d 113, 320 P.2d 315 (1958), a case involving determination of the plaintiff's income while unemployed.

In remanding

to the Industrial Commission this Court stated:
There is another particular about which
the record is so uncertain that no satisfactory
finding can be made. Mr. Johnson did not operate
the farm by himself.
Rather, it was a
family project. His 15 year-old son and
his wife did much of the farm work, even
to the extent of running the tractor. The
entire farm income should therefore not be
attributed to him personally, but there
ought to be some fair and reasonable allocation of the income produced by his efforts
and that produced by his wife and son.
In view of the uncertainty which exists
as to Mr. Johnson's income from self-employment,
this cause is remanded for the purpose of
making a more definite determination of the
income properly assignable to him, and upon
the basis thereof to make such order consistent with the views herein expressed, as may
seem appropriate.
320 P.2d at 319.
The practice of remand is followed by courts in numerous
other jurisdictions in umemployment compensation cases.
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See,

~·

Ambridge Savings & Loan Association v. Unemployment

Compensation Board of Review, 124 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super.
1956), and Lee v. Brown, 148 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1963), which
are both discussed below.

The practice also is in keeping

with general principles of administrative law.

As stated in

2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, §764:
[T]he general rule is that even in the absence
of statute, a court which sets aside an administrative determination has the power to remand
the case to the administrative agency where such
power is necessary to effectuate the demands of
justice, and statutes frequently grant such
authority to the courts. The court does not
encroach upon the administrative function by
such procedure, and there is nothing in the
principles governing judicial review of administrative acts which precludes the courts from
giving an administrative agency an opportunity
to meet objections to its order by correcting
irregularities in procedure, or supplying deficiencies in its record, or making additional
findings where these are necessary, or supplying
findings validly made in the place of those
attacked as invalid.
This Court has the authority either to reverse the Industrial
commission or to remand for additional hearing by the
commission.

In view of the Board of Review's failure to

take evidence and make findings on essential factual issues,
remand is the minimum relief that this Court should grant
Plaintiff.
II

THE ONLY COMPETENT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT ALLOWED HER NOT
TO WORK ON SUNDAYS.

In its Brief, Defendant makes a flat but erroneous
assertion:

"There is direct testimonial evidence that at
-5-
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her initial employment interview Plaintiff agreed to work on
Sundays.

(R.0019)"

Defendant's Brief at 6.

In fact, there

is no competent evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that
Plaintiff agreed to work on Sundays.
Defendant refers is hearsay.

The evidence to which

It comes from a document that

was neither a sworn affidavit nor attested to under oath at
the hearing.

The only direct testimonial evidence, both

from Plaintiff and from the employer, shows that Plaintiff
did not agree to work on Sundays.
The record is replete with evidence that Plaintiff
told the employer that Plaintiff would not work on Sundays.
Plaintiff clearly stated that this was one condition she insisted on before accepting work with the employer.
0036)

(R.0010,

Her other testimony shows the reason for this

demand, a strong religious conviction against work on Sundays.
(R.0010, 0035, 0036)

In fact, being forced to work on Sundays

upset Plaintiff so much that ultimately she contacted Thomas
Hubbard, the employer's Employee Relations Representative,
to inquire whether she should file a grievance report.
(R.0032}

Thus the record contains testimony both proving

that Plaintiff requested and was granted the right not to
work on Sunday and demonstrating the importance of the
reasons which motivated Plaintiff's request.
Defendant contends that there is t8stimonial evidence to rebut this strong showing in the record that Plaintiff was given the contractual right not to work on Sundays.
-6-
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But there is nothing in the record to support Defendant's
assertion.

The employ0r's testimony specifically shows that

the employer also was aware of and even claimed to have
"respected" Plaintiff's contractual right to refuse Sunday
work.

There are two places in the record where the employer

specifically discusses this question.

In both instances, the

testimony supports Plaintiff.
The first statement by the employer is in reponse
to a question about the amount of overtime Plaintiff was
forced to work, at R.0029:
Q.
So this would be over the regular number of
hours, say 40 hours a week?
Ms. Leininger.
Uh, seldom ever.
Seldom ever did
it go over 40 hours,
See, for instance, if
she helped on Saturday afternoon and that, on
her total time there were only two Saturdays and
one Sunday that she worked, I'd have to check
back for sure on that, I'm sorry I didn't document that part, I have it on my calendar, uh,
and then there was another Sunday that she wanted
to work and requested to work and said there
was no problem, church or otherwise. And
I said well now and I'd respected all the
way through and anytime she didn't want to
and she said no this was the time because
she had been gone and she wanted to take a
weekend and she'd be back and she'd like to
work when it was quiet.

Q.
So this then, this work on Sunday was
at her option?
Ms. Leininger.
added.]

This was an agreement {Emphasis

Plaintiff does not concede that she ever "wanted" to work on
Sundays.

In fact,

the supervisor blackmailed Plaintiff into

accepting this work by making clear that Plaintiff otherwise
could not have that Saturday off

wh~n

Plaintiff absolutely
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had to have that Saturday off to move between apartments.
(R.0035)

Even so, the supervisor admitted in the above state-

ment that she was aware Plaintiff did not work on Sundays and
had "respected" Plaintiff's right not to do so.
The only other testimony by the supervisor discussing work on Sunday is equally favorable to Plaintiff.

It

shows that Plaintiff told the supervisor that Plaintiff would
not work on Sundays and that the supervisor told Plaintiff
that she would only have to work one or two Saturdays a month.
The supervisor addressed the Referee's question about Sunday
work in the following manner, at R.0031:
Q.
Did she discuss, ever discuss this matter
of Sunday working with you, to the end that
it be discontinued?
Ms. Leininger.
Never.
She never. The first,
uh, and really on the first time she said she
would be prefer it's true she preferred to
work Saturday afternoon and I said that
would be fine.
I said it would never be
any more than one or two Saturdays a month.
[Emphasis added.]
This testimony by the supervisor also supports Plainitff's
position that she was entitled not to work on Sundays.
Against this sworn testimony, Defendant has found
only a statement written on an unsigned document entitled
"Anita Robinson - Employment Record."

(R.0019)

The only

purpose for which the document was submitted in evidence was
to provide a sequence of dates.
was never attested to.

(R.0028)

Its authenticity

The Appeals Referee did not even ask
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who prepared the document or whether its preparer had personal
knowledge of its statements.

The statement on which Defendant

relies was not even part of the original document, but
was added by unknown persons later on.
This is not the "substantial competent evidence"
required by Martinez v. Board of Review, supra.

A similar

situation was presented in Lee v. Brown, supra, an unemployment compensation case from Louisiana.

A finding that the

plaintiff had been fired for cause was based on an unauthenticated hearsay letter from another employee to an officer of
the plaintiff's employer.

The letter there, like the "Employ-

ment Record" here, was self-serving.

And the Court held the

letter insufficient to sustain the decision:
This hearsay evidence and this ex parte
document did not, of course, constitute
evidence competent to prove the charged
disqualification.
It is true that the statute provides
that the "usual rules of evidence" do not
govern the admissibility of evidence at the
administrative hearing.
LSA-R.S. 23:1631.
Nevertheless, although normally inadmissible
evidence may be received at the hearing, the
actual findings of the administrative agency
that a claimant is disqualified from benefits
must be supported by competent evidence. As
stated at 81 c.J.S. Social Security and Public
Welfare §221, p. 318:
"It is generally held
that the decisions and findings of an administrative tribunal in unemployment compensation
cases must be supported by competent evidence.
The relaxation of the general rules of evidence does not mean that the administrative
tribunal can treat as evidence matter which is
not evidence and has no probative force, and

-9-
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it does not justify orders without a basis
in evidence having rational probative force.
Findings of fact supported only by incompetent
or hearsay evidence are improper, and hearsay
evidence will not be considered in determining
whether the findings are supported by the
evidence,**."
Thus, administrative findings will be set
aside on judicial review, if supported only
by hearsay or other normally inadmissible
evidence of a nature that does not afford the
claimant a fair opportunity of rebuttal or
cross-examination. Miller v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 359 Mich. 342, 102 N. W. 2d 728 (1960);
Ault v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 398
Pa.250, 157 A.2d 375; Phillips v. Unemployment
Compensation Board, 152 Pa.Super. 75, 30 A.2d
718 (1943)....
148 So. 2d at 324-25.
The evidence supporting the Board of Review in this case is
identical to the evidence in Lee v. Brown.
of this case also should be the same.

The disposition

The decision of the

Board of Review should be reversed for lack of substantial
competent evidence.
Indeed, this Court has adhered to the rule that
findings cannot be supported wholly by hearsay or other evidence incompetent in a court of law even when the evidence
was far more reliable than the unauthenticated letter in Lee
or the unsigned record Defendant relies on in this case.

L1

Hackford v. Industrial Commission, 358 P.2d 899 (Utah 1961),
the Industrial Commission's findings as to the plaintiff's
lumbosacral injuries were based upon the two reports of the
plaintiff's treating physician, accompanied by X-rays, and
corroborated by the report of a panel of three orthopedic
surgeons.

Moreover, the panel members were present at the

-10-
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administrative hearing to testify as to their report, but the
plaintiff's attorney expressly rejected an offer to crossexamine them.

And against these reports, even the medical

witnesses whom the plaintiff produced were equivocal as to
the plaintiff's disability.

Id. at 900.

The medical assessment of a worker's condition
implicates a more sharply focused and easily documented
decision than the questions concerning the terms of an agreement or the cause for termination of employment in Plaintiff's
case.

In Hackford,

the decision whether to award disability

benefits turned upon routine, standard, unbiased medical
reports by physician specialists concerning a subject they
had personally examined.

In Plaintiff's case, credibility

and veracity played a significant role in the Commission's
decision, but even when such problems were not a factor, this
Court reversed the Commission's decision, stating:
[T]here must be a residuum of evidence,
legal and competent in a court of law,
to support an award, and a finding cannot
be based wholly upon hearsay evidence.
Id. at 901.
III

PLAINTIFF'S RIC!IT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ALLOWED HER NOT TO WORK ON SUNDAYS.

Defendant admits that if Plaintiff's religious
belief was sincere, her right to free exercise of her religion
was violated by denying her Unemployment Compensation due to
her refusal to work on Sunday.

Defendant's Brief at 12.
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Yet

the Appeals Referee disregarded all indications of the sincerity of Plaintiff's belief.

Her sincerity was first shown

by her statement that she would not work Sunday which she made
at her initial interview for the job, before she knew that the
job conditions might be undesirable, and at the risk of not
being hired.

(R.0036)

From the outset she stated to the

Department of Employment Security that her reason for quitting
was the requirement to work on Sunday - long before she knew
that her claim would be dependent on the sincerity of her
belief.

(R.0047)
The Referee questioned whether Plaintiff's refusal

to work Sundays was the tenet of a specific church, and in
response to her statement that she attended various churches,
he considered her not wanting to work Sundays a desire rather
than a belief.

This questioning was irrelevant and had

prejudicial effect, whereas the resultant conclusion is contrary to the rest of the evidence.

Plaintiff stated her

objection to Sunday work as follows:
It's for religious purposes.
I think that
if the Lord has said has said it is a day of rest
and I personally believe that no matter what
religion we are, whether its, uh, a requirement of the church we go to, whether our church
tells us to, I believe personally that it is
a day of rest and shouldn't be used for work
purposes.
R.0035
It is not a desire, it's a belief and a very,
uh, it's a very strong belief with me.
I think
that the Lord said that he made that decree
whether it with one church or not.
R.0036
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The U11ited States Supreme Court has made it clear
that the right to free exercise of religion is not confined
to traditional or parochial concepts of religion; it is not
conditioned upon membership in or adherence to the teachings
of any organized religion.

As set forth in Davis v. Beason,

133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890}:
With man's relations to his Maker and the
obligations he may think they impose, and
the manner in which an expression shall be
made by him of his belief on those subjects,
no interference can be permitted ••••
The United States and Utah Constitutions do not select any
one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment.
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 76, 87 (1944).

Other-

wise, if only particular beliefs or membership in churches
are recognized as those allowed free exercise, the Establishment Clause is violated.

In Plaintiff's case, it is apparent

that she is a strict fundamentalist whose beliefs derive
directly from the Bible, and the best characterization of
those beliefs might be that for her churches are only too
liberal with ther interpretations of the Scriptures.
The Appeals Referee found that Plaintiff's religious
beliefs were not sincere because she worked on two Sundays.
Yet the Referee made no finding as to Plaintiff's economic
needs at that time which may have compelled her to work so
as to gain her employer's favor.

In this instance, Plaintiff

was forced to choose between following her religious precepts
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and risking her employment or abandoning her religious precepts and working on Sunday.

A condition of employment where

an employee must choose between her job and her religious
beliefs cannot be countenanced in keeping with the guiding
principle of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 ll963), under
which unemployment benefits may not be denied where employment conditions have imposed a burden on the free exercise
of religion.
In applying the eligibility provisions of the Utah
Unemployment Compensation law, Defendant concedes that the
Utah Industrial Commission is bound by the demands of the
Free Exercise Clause as authoritatively conceived by the
majority opinion in Sherbert.

Defendant's Brief at 12.

From

the outset of her employment relationship, Plaintiff insisted
upon observing her day of rest.

After discussing her reli-

gious needs with her employer and still being accepted for
employment, Plaintiff later acceded to her employer's demand
that she work on Sunday.

There is no telling under what

economic pressure she performed that Sunday work, until
eventually her conscience impelled her to assert a positive
refusal.

Defendant contends that having once strayed from

the precepts of her religion by working on Sunday, Plaintiff
somehow forfeited her right to freely exercise her religion.
Defendant did not even consider the fact that Plaintiff,
due to economic necessity, may have had no real choice between
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workir1g Sunday and abiding by the precepts of her religion.
There can be no waiver when the element of choice is in
reality one ''between the rock and the whirlpool."
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 493, 498 (1967).

Garrity

Nor can important

constitutional rights be waived except in a knowing and intelligent manner.

See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

673 (1974); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 ll972).

Moreover,

the very notion of waiver is novel to considerations of the
free exercise of religion and must not be allowed to creep
into free exercise doctrine.

The preferred freedoms of the

United States and Utah Constitutions cannot be so easily
curtailed by the cursory application of a waiver theory.
No case dealing with infringement upon the free
exercise of religion has found any waiver, actual or implied,
of the protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause.

See

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Spence v. Bailey,
465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972); Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp.
22 (W.D. Ky. 1975).

In each of these cases, the court rec-

ognized that although one may submit to infringements upon
religious freedom to a certain point, at some point further
submission is intolerable.

At no point may the exercise of

religious freedom be "deter{red] or discouragefdJ" by denying
government benefits due to the assertion of that right.
Sherbert, supra, 405; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
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(1958) .

Even when the pressure to forfeit the right is not

overwhelming, the United States Supreme Court itself has
specifically interpreted the Sherbert principle to encompass
such infringements:
This Court's decisions have prohibited
conditions on •.. jobs or otherwise, which
dampen the exercise generally of First
Amendment rights, however slight the
inducement to the individual to forsake
those rights. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 348 n.11 (1976).
(Emphasis added.)
Indeed, that Plaintiff may have permitted economic
necessity to conquer her conscience on a previous occasion
is a slender reed upon which to justify the denial of a
government benefit due to the assertion of a fundamental
right.

As set forth under ARGUMENT II, supra, Plaintiff did

not agree to work on Sunday, and the pressure upon her to
forego the practice of her religion, as in Sherbert, is unmistakable.

Even when Plaintiff inquired whether she could

obtain relief from having to work Sunday, the Employee Relations
Representative provided no resolution - he needed to "research
to find out."

(R.0032)

From the Representative's testimony,

it is hardly clear that Plaintiff could not have been led to
believe that further pursuit of a grievance was futile.

Nor

is it clear that she could not have been led to believe that
she had sufficiently presented her grievance.

The Represen-

tative admitted that an oral presentation was normal procedure.
(R.0032)

Yet even if Plaintiff felt pressured to forego her
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principles without her representative's wholehearted support,
Defendant's resurrection of this aberrant interruption of
religious principles, to negate Plaintiff's right to ever
again adhere to them without denial of government benefits,
institutes a novel justification - for which no authority
exists - for governmental intrusion into religious liberty.
Unless reversed by this Court, Defendant's decision
will result in a serious and detrimental "chilling effect" on
the exercise of religious beliefs by both Plaintiff and other
workers.

See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 115 (1974).

Under

Defendant's decision, if employees accede to an employer's
demand to violate their religious precepts even once, they
may never again be able to abide by them without fear of
denial of Unemployment Compensation.

Employers on the other

hand, will be discoura9ed from any "reasonable accomodation"
of religious beliefs.
Hardison,

U.S.
IV

See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
, 97

s.ct.

2264 (1977).

DEFENDANT VIOLATED FURTHER CONTRACT
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

Def~ndant

attempts to justify other unreasonable

working conditions upon the assertion that Plaintiff consented
to them.

Defendant admits both that Plaintiff was required

to work odd hours and that her initial agreement only required
her to work from 11:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Defendant's Brief,
at 8, but then argues that because she fulfilled the extra
work requirements, they were not out of compliance.

Again,
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there is neither evidence that Plaintiff agreed to new terms
nor any finding as to the compelling nature of the employer's
demands and Plaintiff's economic needs.

Although as Defendant

states, Plaintiff was subsequently given overtime pay or
compensatory time off, Defendant's Brief at 2, the fact that
Plaintiff was only belatedly given her pay and the employer's
lack of cooperation in scheduling time off were just further
conditions about which Plaintiff might complain, as shown
at Defendant's citation to the record and following.

(R. 0037-33;

Defendant cites R.0034 as support for finding that
Plaintiff's constitutional right to vote was not infringed.
However, R.0034 reveals the glaring fact that the employer
required Plaintiff to work 50 minutes overtime.

Relying on

the terms of her employment contract that her work day ended
at 7:00 p.m., which would have allowed ample time to travel
to her polling place, Plaintiff had no reason to have tried
to obtain time off from her morning job.

Furthermore, after

Plaintiff expressed her desire to vote, the overtime requirement constituted an intentionl infringement of her right.
Neither can Defendant fall back on the 10-minute trip between
the University and the polls as support for finding it would
not have taken too long to travel there after the morning
job, when such a trip would have involved not only a trip
between the polls and the University at breakneck speed, but
the added distance between the morning job and the polls when Plaintiff was required to be at the second job immediatel;
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after the prior job.

Even accepting the employer's testimony

that Plaintiff did not always arrive immediately after the
prior job on other occasions, this only raises an issue of
misconduct, which constitutes an entirely separate ground for
disqualification from benefits under U.C.A. §35-4-5(b) (1),
which only pertains if an employee is discharged, and which
was not properly raised as an issue herein, although Plaintiff did proffer evidence of her satisfactory performance,
as discussed infra.
To summarize the issue of infringement upon Plaintiff's right to vote, however, the fact that Plaintiff
exercised that right by violating traffic laws and risking
life and limb, rather than being prevented under any circumstances, hardly resolves the problem of infringement.
V

THE APPEALS REFEREE AND BOARD OF REVIEW
FAILED TO TAKE EVIDENCE OR MAKE FINDINGS
ON THE ISSUE OF HARASSMENT BY PLAINTIFF'S
SUPERVISOR.

In her initial Brief, Plaintiff emphasized that
she was harassed by unwarranted criticism of her work.
tiff's Brief at 12-15.

Plain-

Defendant does not question the auth-

ority cited by Plaintiff to the effect that such harassment
constitutes good cause for Plaintiff's voluntary quitting
of employment.

Instead, Defendant contends that the evidence

supports the Board's finding that Plaintiff was not harassed.
Defendant's Brief at 8-9.

The problem with this contention
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is that the Appeals Referee not only refused to listen to
Plaintiff, but ultimately neglected to make any findings at
all on the issue of her harassment.

Despite Defendant's

attempt to gloss over these problems, there are no findings
on harassment which this Court can uphold.
Now Plaintiff can only ask this court to review the
record for itself.

The Board of Review merely affirmed the

Appeals Referee's decision.

(R.0007)

The Appeals Referee

made no findings on the quality of Plaintiff's work or the
validity of the supervisor's criticism of the work.
0018)

(R.0010-

There is no discussion of harassment in either opinion.
However, the record is clear that Plaintiff pro-

ferred evidence to the Appeals Referee to show that her work
was satisfactory, and this evidence was refused:
Q.

All right, fine.

Please continue.

As far as my job performance, I have, uh,
we kept copies of all of the work that we
did, original work, and I had a book of at
least I would say, three or four inch, as
large as those books that you have on your
desk there, book and had started on another
one. As far as production, my shorthand was
coming along very well, in fact, on one day
I took, uh, 28 or 30 pages of legal a typewriter pad, this full, over the telephone, in
notes from her and typed, uh subsequently the
notes and I have a copy of that draft of
not~s showing that the steno and typing was
satisfactory.
Q.
Well, the question, question here is
not regarding the quality and adequacy of
your work, its you voluntarily terminated
your employment and we're trying to determine why you terminated that employment.
R.0039.
[Emphasis added.]
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Yet the record contains ample evidence that the supervisor
was criticizing Plaintiff's work throughout her employment
(R.0022, 0023, 0025), and the fact that the criticism was
unwarranted was why she terminated her employment.

The

Appeals Referee even allowed the supervisor to repeat this
criticism at the hearing.

(R.0032, 0033)

But he did not

give Plaintiff a chance to prove that this criticism was
unjustified.
Defendant's approach to the continual criticism of
Plaintiff's work is to take for granted that the work was
"inadequate" and to congratulate the supervisor for not
terminating Plaintiff earlier.
argument misses the real issue.

Defendant's Brief at 9.

This

If Plaintiff's work was, in

fact, adequate, then the numerous derogatory memos and verbal
criticisms to which Plaintiff was subjected were grounds for
Plaintiff's leaving work.

The memos would be unreasonable,

no matter how worded, if they falsely accused Plaintiff of
poor performance.

But the Appeals Referee did not care to

examine the evidence offered by Plaintiff at the hearing to
disprove the supervisor's criticisms.

Defendant continues,

before this Court, to overlook the possibility that Plaintiff
was doing good work.
The Appeals Referee fell short of his duty to Plaintiff.

That duty was expressed in Hicks v. Mathews, 424 F.
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Supp. 8, 10 (D. Md. 1976), with respect to Social Security
Insurance claims:
Harp v. Richardson, CCH UIR para. 17,324,
p.2413 (D. Md. 1973) (Murray, J.) does impose
a duty on the administrative law judge "in
appropriate instances affirmatively to probe,
inquire and explore the relevant facts", not
to "turn every stone or act as an advocate for
every unrepresented claimant", but "to attempt
to draw out ***ItheJ potential" strength of a
plaintiff's contentions when "the particular
circumstances of a case clearly suggest that a
claimant's proof of his claim is stronger than
what he, on his own, has produced***" (at p.2415).
Judge Murray, in remanding, held that those
obligations were not sufficiently performed
in Harp by the Administrative Law Judge.
Nor
have they been sufficiently performed herein.
The duty of any administrative hearing officer to an unrepresented claimant certainly does not allow an Appeals Referee
to reject evidence that would support a plaintiff's claim
for unemployment insurance.

Plaintiff was unrepresented at

her hearing, so that the Appeals Referee should have met his
own obligation to bring to light evidence favorable to Plaintiff.

He did not come close to fulfilling this duty.

On

the contrary, he refused relevant information offered by
Plaintiff.
dent.

He may well have committed this error by acci-

Nonetheless it was error.

As shown below, it at least

requires that the case be remanded to the Industrial Commission
to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to present the evidence she
originally offered.
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VI

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND THE
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW BECAUSE
THE BOARD FAILED TO MAKE NECESSARY FINDINGS OF FACT.

It is clear that the decision made by the Board of
Review in this case contains reversible error.

The only

question is what remedy Plaintiff is entitled to.

At a

minimum, the case should be returned to the Industrial Cornmission for a rehearing.

That course has been sanctioned by

this Court in Johnson v. Board of Review, supra.

It also is

a practice followed by other state courts in unemployment
compensation cases.

For example, in Ambridge Savings & Loan

Association v. Unemployment compensation Board of Review, supra,
517, the court remanded an unemployment compensation case for
rehearing, stating:
Where factual questions are not resolved
this court will remand the case to the Board
for further proceedings.

***
There is no finding as to whether or not
the claimant took the precautions which a reasonably
prudent person should take to preserve the
employment relationship during her absence
and whether or not her conduct was consistent with a genuine desire to work. We cannot assume from the award that the Board
made the necessary findings, for to infer
the facts from the conslusion would be "an
inversion of logical reasoning". Myers
Unemployment Compensation Case, 1949, 164 Pa.
Super. 150, 63 A.2d 371, 373.
Since it is not the duty of this Court
to decide whose testimony is credible and
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which facts are determinative we must refer
the matter back to the Board to make findings
and appropriate conclusions and to enter an
order in conformity with such findings and
conclusions.
Lavely Unemployment Compensation Case, 1948, 163 Pa. Super. 66, 60 A.2d
352.
The record in Plaintiff's case clearly presents points on
which the Board failed to make necessary findings.

If this

Court finds the record unclear as to the proper findings on
those points, then Plaintiff's case should be remanded.
CONCLUSION
On any of the procedural, contractual, and constitutional bases set out above and in Plaintiff's original
Brief, Plaintiff should be granted relief from Defendant's
decision.
Respectfully submitted,

Lucy Billings
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Reply Brief to K. Allan Zabel,1
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